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Despite the expansion of the world economy in recent years, the 
employment situation remains uncertain, with a high percentage of the 
labour force unemployed or engaged in occupations that do not enable 
workers to escape from poverty. Recent growth rates in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, which have been relatively high compared with 
historical levels —albeit lower than those recorded in other regions— 
have had a favourable impact on job creation, employment rates and 
poverty; however, serious problems still persist, in our region as well, 
in terms of high unemployment, underemployment and job insecurity, 
and these situations are compounded by barriers to access to productive 
employment affecting specific sectors of the population, especially the 
least skilled, including youth and women.
 Sustained economic growth is known to be necessary, albeit insufficient, 
for generating high-quality employment and this, in turn, is recognized 
as the material base needed to ensure a decent life for the vast majority 
of the population and to build social cohesion in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. 
 Labour-market trends reflect economic growth, which, according to 
its characteristics alters the extent and composition of labour demand. 
However, work must be considered as an input in the productive process, 
so that its features and the way in which it fits into this process have an 
impact on the characteristics of the latter. 
 The nature of both links, between work and employment, on the one 
hand, and between the productive process and economic growth, on the 
other, is determined to a great extent by labour-market institutions, whose 
purpose, ultimately, is to generate quality employment. To this end, the 
two-fold objective of ensuring the efficient operation of the labour market 
and protecting the more vulnerable actors must be pursued.
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 Like all institutions, labour-market institutions are products of history, 
the result of social, political, economic and cultural interactions in a given 
place and at a given time. The fulfilment of the above-mentioned objectives 
hinges mainly on the responses developed to meet the challenges posed 
by a particular economic, social, political and cultural context.
As pointed out in this document, the current challenges stem from 
open, volatile economies which are radically different from the growth and 
development models that were current in the post-war era. In the face of 
stiff competition and constant technological change, the economies of the 
region are under pressure to increase their capacity for adjustment in many 
areas, among them labour-market institutions. They must also work out 
a long-term development strategy to stimulate systemic competitiveness, 
and this calls for on-going education and training of the labour force. 
The former mechanisms for the protection of workers —centred on job 
security— and the old ways of consolidating their position in the labour 
market over time, precisely through seniority in a stable job position, have 
been declining. This brings to the fore the challenge to create worker 
protection mechanisms and promote career advancement in the context 
of present-day labour markets. Lastly, efforts must be made to expand 
the coverage of labour-market institutions in order to encompass broad 
segments of the labour force that do not enjoy their benefits or comply 
with their obligations.
 ECLAC, with support from the Government of Denmark, has prepared 
the study “Labour markets, worker protection and life-long learning in a 
global economy: experience and perspectives from Latin America and the 
Caribbean”, which seeks to contribute to the debate in the countries of 
the region in the search for creative solutions to the problems —whether 
old or new— currently being faced in the region.
This document, which consists of nine sections, gives a brief outline 
of the main findings of the study. Following a short introduction, section 
2 describes the situation and recent labour-market trends in the region, 
which reflect the favourable macroeconomic context of recent years, 
although serious problems persist for a large proportion of the workforce. 
Section 3 looks at the characteristics of labour-market institutions and 
the three following sections sum up the changes introduced in recent 
years in the three pillars of labour-market institutionality: labour market 
regulation, unemployment protection and active labour-market policies. It 
ECLAC 2008
7
should be noted that no single approach has been used to improve these 
institutions in the face of the above-mentioned challenges and that major 
deficiencies persist in all three areas. Section 7 discusses flexicurity, the 
approach used by the countries of the European Union, in a context that 
bears little resemblance to that of our region, to confront the challenges 
emerging in the current phase of world economic development. Section 
8 analyses the hurdles that Latin American and Caribbean countries will 
need to overcome in order to change their institutions, bearing in mind 
the basic tenets of flexicurity, and puts forward proposals for reforming 
the three areas of labour institutionality. The final section presents 
some considerations relating to strategic aspects of a process of reforms 
negotiated in order to strengthen labour institutions in the countries of 
the region.
 One of the findings of the study is that, while countries face similar 
challenges, the solutions must be varied according to each country’s 
peculiar characteristics, in order to reach a sufficiently broad consensus 
to give labour-market institutions legitimacy and, consequently, social 
sustainability To that end, social dialogue —however complex and difficult, 
given the historical background of our countries— remains the most suitable 
avenue. In view of the region’s past experience, this dialogue will only be 
successful if it is part of a process that generates mutual respect, recognition 
and trust. Consequently, while the reforms in the three areas of labour 
institutionality should be considered as complementary, the approach that 
promises to yield the greatest successes in terms of legitimacy and social 
sustainability is a gradual one. Lastly, labour-market institutions must be 
part of a more comprehensive effort to devise a development strategy for 
the countries of the region, including the definition of objectives relating 
to job creation and job quality. Labour-market institutions must contribute 
to the objectives thus defined.
José Luis Machinea
Executive Secretary 
Economic Commission for 





Introduction: the global economy 
and labour-market challenges
The changes that the global economy has experienced in recent years 
have generated new challenges for societies and economies all over the 
world. Growing trade in goods, services and information, heavy capital 
flows, and massive international migration are producing what has been 
called a second wave of globalization. While benefiting from the positive 
aspects of market integration, the more open economies are faced 
with the cost of adapting continuously to a volatile and unpredictable 
economic environment.
To take maximum advantage of the potential benefits, countries must 
try to improve their systemic competitiveness, but at the same time they 
need to establish efficient adjustment mechanisms and social security 
systems to protect those affected by these adjustments, in order to limit 
the costs inherent in a volatile environment and to distribute them as 
fairly as possible.
In this context, firms are demanding flexibility in market regulations 
so that they can adapt promptly to shifts in demand, and so that they can 
reduce economic transaction costs (World Bank 2007). Yet if they are 
to remain competitive over the long run, firms will also need to adopt 
strategies for increasing productivity, and the key elements here are process 
and product innovation and a skilled labour force.
The changes noted above have had an enormous impact on labour 
markets. Factors such as technological change, which makes productive 
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processes more flexible, the growing mobility of capital and technology, and 
the adoption of business strategies in response to the shifting context tend 
to diversify and polarize occupational patterns. Moreover, the integration 
of the economies of Asia and of countries of the former Soviet Union into 
the world market has in effect doubled the global labour force (Freeman 
2005a). The labour force in Latin America and the Caribbean, in particular, 
faces competition both from skilled workers in highly industrialized 
countries and from less-skilled workers who compete by accepting low 
wages. In this setting, workers are demanding more protection and 
greater opportunities for promotion and advancement. When it comes 
to meeting these demands, the protection mechanisms of the past, which 
focused on employment stability, are losing their relevance. Because a 
great proportion of the Latin American and the Caribbean workforce is 
excluded from institutionalized labour relations, there is an additional 
demand to make labour-market institutions increasingly inclusive of this 
segment of the population.
The ultimate purpose of labour-market institutions is to generate 
high-quality employment. Employers and workers alike are insisting that, 
to reflect socioeconomic changes, there must be adjustments to the three 
pillars of the system of labour-market institutions: labour-market regulation, 
unemployment protection systems, and active labour-market policies. In 
recent decades, many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have 
undertaken reforms in these three areas. However, many of these reforms 
have lacked coherence and consistency over time, due primarily to the lack 
of an underlying consensus on how labour institutions as a whole should 
be revamped.
Some European countries have responded to the challenge of adapting 
their labour-market institutions (challenges which, while similar, have to 
be faced in a very different socioeconomic context) by combining flexible 
labour regulation with solid mechanisms for protecting the unemployed, 
including direct financial subsidies and active labour-market policies. 
This response is based on the concept of “flexicurity”. For many reasons, 
experiments in other parts of the world do not offer much of a model for 
the changes that are needed in the Latin American and Caribbean region. 
Nevertheless, there are some lessons to be drawn from these experiments. 
They include the need to adapt labour institutions to a new economic and 
social context, one that is more dynamic and changeable, the importance of 
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negotiated adaptation to make sure that the new institutions are sustainable 
over time, the need for a comprehensive approach that treats the different 
components of these institutions as complementary, and the need to consider 





Labour markets in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: current situation and trends
Historically, demographic growth has exerted heavy pressure on Latin 
America and the Caribbean labour markets, with the ranks of new jobseekers 
swelling year by year. Yet the demographic transition of recent decades has 
tended to mitigate this pressure, and indeed, in recent years, has helped to 
reduce it. While the region’s working-age population (defined as all persons 
aged 15 years and older) was growing annually by 2.9% in the early 1970s, 
this indicator will drop to 1.8% over the five-year period 2005-2010. In 
the decade 2000-2010, the increase in the working age population will 
have declined even in absolute terms, from a maximum of 37.7 million in 
2000-2005 to a projected 37.0 million in 2006-2010 (ECLAC 2004a).
This tendency is even more pronounced in urban areas. Sharp migratory 
flows caused the urban working-age population to grow by 4.2% a year 
in the first half of the 1970s; 30 years later, the figure stood at 2.4% and, 
according to projections, will fall to 2.1% in 2005-2010.
Alongside these demographic trends, growth in the labour force is 
also influenced by changes in participation rates (the percentage of the 
working age population that is actually in the labour market). The following 
tendencies have had important medium and long-term effects:
In recent decades there has been a steep increase in the female • 
participation rate, although it is still well below that for men. 
The fact that young men remain longer in school has tended to • 
slow the increase in the male participation rate. While in many 
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countries young women have achieved higher education levels than 
men, this has not slowed the female participation rate, which was 
already lower than that for men: what declined was the percentage 
of women engaged in domestic work. 
Workforce participation tends to drop when people reach retirement • 
age, especially if there are broad social protection systems in place. 
The increase in the number of persons older than 65 years tends to 
dampen labour participation rates, especially in urban areas.
Because it was the first of these tendencies that dominated in most 
countries, the overall participation rate has risen, despite short-term 
fluctuations in the supply of labour in reaction to the macroeconomic 
situation.1
Notwithstanding the reduced labour supply pressures resulting from 
demographic trends, unemployment increased during the 1990s and the 
beginnings of this decade. As figure 1 shows, job generation was insufficient, 
until 2003, to offset the increase in the labour force: as a consequence 
unemployment, which appears in the figure as the difference between the 
participation rate and the employment rate, rose throughout this period. 
This trend was especially marked following 1995, when successive economic 
crises had an extraordinary impact on unemployment, which remained at 
historically high levels because of the lack of sustained economic growth. 
The region’s unemployment began to decline in 2004, thanks primarily to 
an upsurge in job creation, and by 2007 the jobless rate dropped to below 
8.0%, from a peak of 11.0% in 2002-2003 (ECLAC 2007a).
The high and persistent level of open unemployment recorded after 1995 
was in fact without precedent in the region, for while previous economic 
crises sparked a jump in unemployment, this always dropped back fairly 
quickly, even at times of weak economic growth, as in the 1980s. In those 
circumstances, open unemployment was followed by a period when jobs 
were more available in low-productivity sectors, a process that was not so 
apparent after 1995.2
1 The labour supply response to the business cycle varies among countries: see Machinea, Kacef 
and Weller (2007).
2 The low-productivity sector is measured on the basis of household surveys, and covers employers 
and wage-workers in microenterprises, domestic service, and self-employed workers with no 
professional or technical qualifications.
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More recently, employment trends in low-, medium- and high-
productivity sectors have varied. Between 1990 and 2002, the medium- and 
high-productivity sectors showed a slight increase in their share of urban 
employment (from 58.9% to 59.6%). This increase was not generalized, 
however, and in 12 of 17 countries the share of these sectors declined, 
while that of the low-productivity sector rose (ECLAC 2007c, p. 133).3 
Between 2002 and 2005, the composition of employment improved: the 
proportion of the medium- and high-productivity sectors increased in 8 of 
15 countries, rising from 59.6% to 62.6% for the region as a whole.
Another important factor has been heavy outward migration from the 
region. In addition to the long-standing emigration of Mexican, Central 
3 Brazil was one of the countries in which the low-productivity sector share declined, and this 
explains most of the decline in the weighted regional average.
Figure 1
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) based on official 
country data.
a Preliminary data.
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American and Caribbean workers to the United States, there has been a sharp 
increase in persons leaving the region because of severe economic crises. 
Because of differences in welfare levels between neighbouring countries, 
these crises have also sparked intra-regional migrations. According to 
ECLAC estimates, 11 countries in the region have net annual migration 
rates of two persons per thousand or more.4
A further labour-market problem is the declining quality of employment. 
A major component of this phenomenon is the reduced coverage of social 
security programs, reflecting greater job instability. The proportion of 
employed people contributing to social security systems dropped from 
63.3% in 1990 to 55.5% in 2002, increasing slightly in subsequent years 
to 56.7% in 2005 (ECLAC 2007c, p. 136). It should be noted that this 
reduction in protection levels also affected those with wage jobs, among 
whom the percentage of contributors declined from 72.4% in 1990 to 68.2% 
in 2005. Another indicator reflecting the deterioration in job quality in the 
1990s was the significant proportion of wage earners who had no formal 
contract, or only a short-term contract (ECLAC 2007c, p. 135), possibly 
reflecting the increase in outsourcing. Generally speaking, employment 
has become increasingly precarious. 
Within the region, the trend in average real wages in the formal sector 
has varied, depending on the method of calculation used. The index based 
on median annual wage growth rates shows that wages rose by 30% over 
the period 1990-2007 (1.5% a year), more than offsetting the 11% loss in 
the 1980s. By contrast, using an index that represents the weighted average 
of wage growth rates, the cumulative increase over the last 17 years was 
only 12%, or an average annual growth of 0.6%. From this perspective, 
wage increases lagged slightly behind output per worker, which grew by 
around 0.8% annually between 1990 and 2006.
Figure 2 shows that, after a drastic drop in average labour productivity 
in the 1980s, output per worker resumed a gently upward path until 1997, 
although it did not regain its 1980 level. This trend can be attributed to a 
significant increase in productivity in the primary and secondary sectors, 
in the context of freer trade. Average productivity in the tertiary sector 
4   Those countries are, in descending order: Guyana, Suriname, Saint Lucia, Jamaica, 




(a variable that is more difficult to measure) appears to have increased in 
only certain years, and it retreated at the end of the “tequila crisis”, with 
the expansion of the informal urban economy that characterizes many 
branches of the tertiary sector.
Between 1997 and 2003, average labour productivity stagnated. Only 
in the primary sector was there an increase in labour productivity, due 
primarily to the modernization of capital-intensive commercial agriculture, 
the shedding of labour in certain sectors of the small farm economy, and the 
expansion of mining. Since 2004, with the improvement in macroeconomic 
conditions, all sectors have seen a rise in productivity, although in 2006 
productivity had yet to regain its 1980 level.
In fact, the problems that Latin America and the Caribbean countries have 
encountered in boosting their productivity, and hence their competitiveness 
and economic growth, are key factors for explaining why labour conditions 
Figure 2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: 
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have not improved much in the region. This weakness is also reflected in 
the sharp drop in total factor productivity that many countries suffered 
in recent decades, although some performed better in the 1990s (ECLAC 
2004c, Chapter V).
Lower labour productivity translates into a high incidence of poverty 
among workers. Naturally, poverty is less prevalent among the working 
population than in the population as a whole, yet it is noteworthy that 27% 
of urban workers and 48% of rural workers earn too little to raise their 
per capita household incomes above the poverty line.5
Finally, labour-market trends do not affect all groups equally. The causes 
of this inequality lie in factors outside the labour market, such as unequal 
education opportunities, the weaknesses of labour-market institutions, 
and patterns of discrimination or bias in favour of certain segments 
of the labour force. Various indicators, such as a rising unemployment 
rate, or longer job-seeking periods, difficulties in landing certain jobs, 
pay differentials for the same type of work, and the wide and growing 
wage gap among sectors, demonstrate the need for specific measures to 
promote employment opportunities for the most affected groups. Those 
groups include, in particular, women and young people, especially those 
with little schooling, and ethnic minorities. At the same time, inequality 
is ingrained in the structural heterogeneity of the region, which expresses 
itself in great productivity differences and in the concentration of poor 
workers in the low-productivity sector.
As noted above, the economic dynamism recorded in the region since 
2004, with annual growth rates of 5.5% between 2004 and 2007, has helped 
to boost labour performance. Following are some of the most noteworthy 
developments in this period:6
The employment rate rose steadily, and in 2007 it was 1.5 percentage • 
points above the average for the 1990s. 
The unemployment rate fell by three percentage points between • 
2003 and 2007 and, at 8.0%, stood at early 1990s levels. 
5 Simple average of 18 countries for urban workers and 15 countries for rural workers, based on 
ECLAC calculations (2007c).
6 See ECLAC (2007a, 2007b, 2007c) and Machinea, Kacef and Weller (2007).
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Job creation was heaviest in wage-paying employment, reflecting • 
strong labour demand and a growth-employment elasticity of around 
0.7 between 2004 and 2007. 
Formal employment expanded as measured both by the structure • 
of the labour market and by enrolment in social security systems 
and contributions to those systems. 
There was also an increase in more unstable contractual relationships. • 
The impact of higher labour demand was felt primarily in job • 
creation, while wages in the formal sector increased only slightly 
in most countries. 
Labour productivity improved after a period of stagnation that lasted • 
for about 10 years from the mid-1990s. 
Poverty levels declined, thanks to higher employment levels, • 
demographic changes that reduced dependency ratios and, to a 
lesser degree, higher wages.
In summary, the relatively high economic growth of recent years, 
supported by a very favourable external environment, has had a positive 
impact on labour performance. Yet unemployment and underemployment 
rates in the region remain high, and many people are unable to escape 
from poverty even if they have jobs. Despite the relatively solid labour 
performance of recent years, then, the region cannot afford to overlook 
questions such as the following:
Are existing labour-market institutions helping to create high-quality • 
jobs, or are they an obstacle to better performance? 
Are existing labour-market institutions contributing to the systemic • 
competitiveness of Latin American and Caribbean countries? 
Do labour-market institutions promote the efficient functioning • 
of labour markets? 
Do labour-market institutions protect and strengthen the weakest players • 
in a market with structural inequalities among participants? 
Do labour-market institutions foster the inclusion of persons working • 






Labour-market institutions are mechanisms with differing degrees of 
formality that establish the rules of behaviour for participants in the 
labour market. Examples of such institutions include legislation governing 
individual and collective labour relationships, active labour-market policies, 
unemployment protection systems, and also informal agreements, regarding 
labour relations. The ultimate goal of labour-market institutions is to generate 
high-quality employment. To achieve this goal, institutions must meet two 
objectives: they must ensure an efficiently functioning labour market, i.e. 
the optimal allocation of resources, and they must guarantee protection 
and support for the weakest players in a market characterized by structural 
inequalities among participants. In this way, properly designed labour 
institutions stimulate economic growth, competitiveness, employment, 
and social cohesion.
When these objectives come into conflict, it is up to labour policy to 
find the appropriate balance. For this there is no “best” solution, however, 
and the response will always depend on temporal and spatial factors. On 
one hand, shifting conditions in other markets may spark modifications in 
labour-market institutions. On the other hand, labour institutions are the 
result of historic processes specific to each country. This means that, while 
a given institutional rule may be broadly accepted in one country because 
of its social history, and may contribute to achieving objectives there, in 
another society that same rule may be controversial and its implementation 
can upset the functioning of other institutions.
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In the context of Latin America’s “inward-oriented” development, 
labour institutions similar to those in more industrialized countries were 
created.7 The intent was to establish a comprehensive framework that 
would take account of the sharp increase in wage employment in the 
industrial and tertiary sectors, and respond to the demands of emerging 
social sectors. As happened in more developed countries, Latin America 
and the Caribbean created institutions to regulate labour relationships, 
both directly through the State and through collective bargaining. Yet 
there are a number of features that distinguish Latin American experience 
from that in industrialized countries:
The coverage of labour institutions was confined to a much smaller • 
sector of the labour force. 
Within that sector, there was less observance of existing rules. • 
In many countries, relations among the principal socioeconomic • 
agents (public sector, employers, unions) were determined by a 
populist State that proposed a social covenant under its leadership. In 
this context, the unions came to depend heavily on certain political 
forces or the State, favouring political over labour negotiations, and 
legal regulation over arrangements negotiated between employers 
and unions. 
In some cases, social and political instability sparked a cycle in which, • 
at some point, integrative institutions were replaced by authoritarian 
regulations that dismantled or undermined union organization, after 
which those institutions were re-established. 
In countries with a weak productive base and exclusive social • 
and political systems, the predominant form of collective labour 
relations was authoritarian and repressive, while individual labour 
relations were frequently geared to protection of workers, even 
though the coverage of labour institutions was narrower than in 
more developed countries.
7 The two principal regulatory mechanisms in industrial countries were labour and social legislation, 
and collective bargaining. In the context of a broad national covenant, whether tacit or explicit, 
between firms, workers and the State, these regulations improved working conditions (with 
higher real wages, shorter working hours, provisions against unemployment, sickness and 
disability, and regulation of workplace safety and hygiene, among other improvements), and 
they contributed to increasing labour productivity (through training and organization of work).
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It is reasonable to conclude that, while the basic features of labour 
institutions in more industrialized countries were repeated in Latin 
American and Caribbean countries, they embraced there a much smaller 
portion of the productive, social and political structure. Moreover, large 
segments of the population, the weight of which varied from one country 
to another, remained excluded from these processes and benefited only 
indirectly from the progress that was made (for example, social policies, 
“trickle-down” income effects, or they suffered economic dislocation 
and social marginalization. Thus, labour institutions generally failed to 
achieve the stability typical of social covenants in industrialized countries, 
and they did not produce the desired social cohesion. It may be noted that 
the situation was slightly different in Caribbean countries, where labour 
institutions followed Anglo-Saxon models, meaning that there was less 
State intervention in labour-market regulation.
In economies that were much more closed than those of highly 
industrialized countries, some elements of Latin American economic 
regulation had an adverse impact on economic efficiency.8 Yet during the 
1970s and a large portion of the 1980s, most analysts were convinced that 
Latin American labour markets were functioning reasonably well (Squire 
1981, Gregory 1986).
Nevertheless, the technical and economic changes that have occurred 
at the global, regional and national levels in recent decades have modified 
the functioning of other markets, and have exerted renewed pressure on 
the labour market. In particular:
market opening increased the competitive pressure on national • 
economies and on firms, obliging them to make better use of the 
factors of production and to strive for steadily rising productivity; and 
recent technological progress has allowed production processes to • 
adapt more swiftly, and has forced firms to make greater adjustments 
to shifting patterns of demand. Elements such as quality, innovation, 
diversity and creativity have gained importance in comparison with 
8 For example, wage increases and high earnings expectations tended to be passed on in higher 
prices.
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the standardized, large-scale production lines that characterized 
the Taylorist system.9
As a consequence, labour demand has become more heterogeneous and 
requires swifter adjustment. When it comes to the labour supply, a more 
heterogeneous workforce (in which there is growing female participation, 
and where young people have specific preferences with respect to working 
conditions) requires labour relations that are different from those that 
predominated in previous stages, designed to fit the “typical worker”, i.e. the 
adult male (Cortázar 2004). This greater heterogeneity of both supply and 
demand implies less direct State intervention, which would now be limited 
to establishing a ‘floor’ for labour rights and mechanisms for protecting 
specific groups. In general terms, labour relations are increasingly being 
negotiated between firms and workers, and at different levels, for example 
within a specific branch of activity, and complementarity at the level of the 
firm. In short, while there is no single regulatory system that can best fulfil 
these objectives, more adaptable internal and external labour markets could 
play an important role in making the productive process more flexible.
In this setting of more volatile markets, workers tend to ` emand more 
stability and protection. The traditional response of labour legislation 
to these demands has been to discourage layoffs through a system of 
compensation for “dismissal without` just cause”, in an effort to avoid high 
turnover rates. In the current context, where economic volatility tends 
to reduce employment stability, the focus should be on another kind of 
stability, relating in particularly to incomes (ILO 2004a). It must also be 
recalled that (to differing degrees among countries) a high proportion of 
the labour force is not covered by labour institutions, a fact that tends to 
undermine social cohesion. Consequently, further attention needs to be 
paid to two instruments:
systems for protecting the unemployed; and • 
active labour-market policies that will help the unemployed rejoin • 
the labour market promptly, and will improve the employability of 
those excluded from labour institutions.
9 Because technological change is less generalized in Latin America and the Caribbean than in 
the more industrialized countries, these factors are less widespread in the region. In any case, 
they are becoming more important as Latin America and the Caribbean countries attempt to 
bolster their productive structure through technological change, innovations, and upgrading 
of the labour force.
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Finally, labour-market institutions must be appreciated in the context 
of a long-term development strategy. The question is this: what is the 
basis for building systemic competitiveness in Latin America and the 
Caribbean countries? If the answer is that growth and development must 
increasingly be based on innovation and knowledge, on the production 
of higher value-added goods, and on rising productivity (ECLAC 2004b), 
then it is obvious that labour institutions must be such as to promote the 
accumulation of human capital and to foster labour relations and business 
organization schemes that will stimulate cooperation, at the level of the 






The profound crisis that marked the 1980s, and caused it to be known 
as “the lost decade”, had severe repercussions (de facto if not de jure) on 
labour-market regulation. As the informal economy spread, the scope 
for enforcing formal regulations shrank even further and, in many cases, 
rising inflation caused real wages to fall, a situation that was unavoidable, 
since labour unions were weakened and minimum wage policies were 
subordinated to anti-inflation strategies.
The situation provoked calls for structural reforms, and these were 
subsequently compiled into the “Washington Consensus” (Williamson 
1990), the basic idea of which was that less market regulation would 
generate higher rates of economic growth, while macroeconomic policy 
would be designed to avoid the imbalances that hampered the efficient 
allocation of resources. Among other things, this consensus championed 
freer trade in goods and services, fewer restrictions on foreign investment, 
the privatization of public enterprises, less government intervention in 
financial and other markets, and measures to control fiscal deficits.
Labour reforms had little place in this framework, probably because it 
was expected that other reforms would have a more significant effect on 
economic growth and the labour market, particularly if existing labour-
market institutions functioned properly. Moreover, the risk that wide-
ranging labour-market reforms would spark social conflict was probably 
another dissuasive consideration.
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Consequently, during the 1980s only a few countries —Chile in particular, 
and Panama to a lesser extent— took any significant steps to make labour 
relations more flexible. In other countries, for example Argentina, Brazil 
and Uruguay, priority was given to re-establishing collective labour rights 
that had been suppressed by military dictatorships, and to expanding 
individual labour rights. Brazil took the lead in this regard, through a 
constitutional reform (Chahad 2008).
In part because of the disappointing results of the “first generation” 
reforms, a series of supplementary reforms were proposed in the 1990s, 
including labour reforms (IDB 1997). Over the past decade, many 
countries have reformed their labour legislation, in most cases in order to 
bring greater flexibility to specific aspects of the labour market, with the 
emphasis on expanding the available range of contractual arrangements. 
The intent was to supplement contracts of indeterminate duration with a 
series of fixed-term contracts, to expand the use of probationary periods, 
and to facilitate subcontracting. The second tendency was to make it easier 
to fire or lay off workers: chief among these measures were a broadening 
of the definition of “dismissal for just cause” and the introduction of 
unemployment protection systems based on individual accounts. Other 
flexibility-oriented reforms included the de-indexing of wages, more flexible 
working hours, and a reduction in non-wage labour costs.
According to detailed ILO studies (Vega Ruiz 2005), it was in Argentina 
and Peru that the most wide-ranging reforms took place following 1990. 
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Panama also introduced changes to the key 
institutions of labour relations, while efforts to achieve greater flexibility 
were of lesser scope in Chile, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Venezuela and the 
Dominican Republic. Other countries, including Mexico, made no significant 
changes in their labour legislation (Ruiz Durán 2008).
It should be noted that these legal changes did not represent a general 
move towards greater flexibility, either at the regional level or within the 
model adopted by individual countries. A number of countries extended 
vacation periods and adopted laws to improve protection for specific 
groups. For example, measures were taken to protect working mothers 
and to eradicate the worst forms of child labour. As well, during the first 
half of the 1990s, legal changes led to a strengthening of labour unions 
in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica, while they were weakened in 
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Argentina and Peru. In Chile, some of the deregulation measures from 
the 1980s were reversed.
In the present decade, Chile and Peru, among other countries, have 
introduced new, “atypical” labour contracts. Chile, for example, developed 
contracts covering part-time work, the promotion of youth employment, 
and teleworking (Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, 2003), while Peru 
designed new, atypical contracts to encourage youth employment, especially 
in conjunction with various training instruments (Toyama 2008).10 In a switch 
from the prevailing trend of the previous decade, other countries restricted 
the use of “atypical” contracts. Taking the Spanish example from the late 
1990s, Argentina replaced the strategy of making contractual relationships 
more flexible via atypical contracts, nullifying some of those agreements 
through amendments to standard contracts (Tokman 2007a).
Since 2000, generally speaking, there have been no further wide-
ranging reforms for greater flexibility, and such measures as have been 
adopted have focused on small businesses and micro-enterprise, or on 
specific sectors, such as agricultural exports in Peru. On the other hand, 
some of the more recent reforms have stressed the overhaul of collective 
labour relations in order to bring them into line with ILO standards and 
to strengthen collective bargaining (Vega Ruiz 2005). Some countries have 
also broadened somewhat the spectrum of issues covered by collective 
bargaining (Vega Ruiz 2005, p. 13), while extending this to new groups such 
as seasonal workers (Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare 2003, p. 97). 
In general, these reforms have improved the conditions for labour union 
organization, and in some cases have succeeded in halting or reversing 
the downward trend in unionization.
As well, a number of countries have reformed individual labour 
relations to make them more protective. For example, Chile has reduced the 
number of hours in the workweek and increased the scale of compensation 
for unjustified dismissal (Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare 2003). 
Argentina has also increased compensation, especially for workers with 
little seniority (Golden 2008). Some countries have placed restrictions on 
overtime, or raised overtime pay rates (Vega Ruiz 2005, p. 45). In some 
10 Nicaragua and Paraguay also saw the emergence of new types of contracts to help young 
people land a formal “first job” (Vega Ruiz 2005, p. 30). Peru also tried to encourage the hiring 
of persons 45 years and older.
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cases, such as Chile, Colombia and Peru, the abuses detected in the use of 
personnel subcontracting has led to limits on this contractual instrument 
(Toyama 2008; Velazquez 2008; and Puyo Posada 2007). In Argentina and 
Venezuela, temporary measures have been taken to prevent the layoff of 
workers during an economic crisis.
Given the disparity between existing legislation and levels of compliance, 
several countries have significantly bolstered the resources available for 
labour inspections.11 One obstacle to the proper functioning of labour 
institutions is the ineffectiveness of the labour courts, as reflected in the 
length of proceedings. A number of countries have introduced reforms 
to improve this aspect of labour institutions (Vega Ruiz 2005, p. 25; 
Bensusán 2006).12
Although this has not been the dominant trend, labour reforms in 
some countries have resulted from a process of social dialogue.13 The most 
wide-ranging reforms in general have been applied under exceptional 
circumstances that precluded adequate participation by the parties. This 
rendered the reforms unsustainable, and they were subsequently amended, 
sometimes in the opposite direction. International commitments today play 
an increasingly important role in the debate. Those commitments include 
the ILO conventions as well as proposals relating to labour legislation 
and its enforcement that have emerged in the course of trade negotiations, 
especially with the United States. While the emphasis in the first free trade 
treaties between the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean 
countries was on the enforcement of national legislation, some countries 
in recent years, including Colombia and Peru, have committed themselves 
to amend their laws in order to win approval of these treaties.
Generally speaking, the main changes have been to individual labour 
rights, while collective bargaining rights have been weakened for various 
reasons, including the following (Weller 2000):
11 Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru, among others; see the consulting reports.
12 It has been argued that in some countries labour court jurisprudence has had an important 
impact on the functioning of labour institutions, particularly as a result of inconsistencies between 
constitutional rights and legal provisions (Ermida 2007; Toyama 2008).
13 For example, in El Salvador and the Dominican Republic tripartite pacts were negotiated (Vega 
Ruiz 2005, p. 21). Other countries as well undertook exercises at social dialogue, of varying 
thematic coverage and final scope.
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The productive structure has been reorganized, increasing the weight • 
of SMEs and making union organization more difficult (particularly 
in many tertiary fields), as well as reinforcing the role of occupations 
that do not fit the traditional pattern of union affiliation (professionals, 
technicians, administrative and other careers). 
Technological change has reduced the tendency of large groups of • 
workers to gravitate towards homogeneous occupations. 
The union movement has faced repression, especially under military • 
dictatorships and during the economic crisis of the 1980s. 
Legislative changes have restricted the scope of union action. • 
Some unions have lost their legitimacy because of their close ties to • 
political parties, or because of non-transparent practices. 
The tendency of unions to look to the State to address their demands, • 
and not to employers, is out of touch with the new development 
modality. 
Employment has declined in the public sector, where unionization • 
rates were frequently high.
As noted above, some countries have taken steps since the 1990s to 
strengthen collective bargaining, but their intent was not necessarily to 
negotiate flexibility as a strategic component of institutional reform.
In conclusion, labour regulation has undergone various changes 
in recent decades. First, during the 1980s and part of the 1990s, the 
employment structure became more informal and the coverage of formal 
labour institutions narrowed. This reflected not only the growth of the 
informal sector (comprising primarily micro-enterprises and unskilled 
own-account workers) but also “moonlighting”, and a growing tendency 
to “delaborization”, i.e. concealing the relationship of dependency between 
worker and employer by giving it the gloss of a business relationship 
(Morgado 1999; Goldin 2008).
Second, during the 1990s, and even earlier in some cases, labour reforms 
were clearly (but not exclusively) aimed at achieving greater flexibility. While 
deep reforms were implemented in some countries (Argentina, Peru and 
Chile in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s), in other countries the 
changes were much more gradual and lacked a clear strategic direction.
Third, during the present decade, efforts to make labour relations 
more flexible have been more modest in scope, and in some countries the 
main thrust has been to provide greater protection for workers in both 
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their individual and their collective labour relations.14 Countries that had 
introduced greater flexibility, such as Argentina, Chile and Peru, often 
within an “exceptional” institutional context, have recently amended those 
reforms and have refocused attention on certain aspects of protection.15
14 This coincided with the international debate from which there emerged a greater degree of 
caution with respect to radical deregulation measures (Freeman 2005b).





The traditional approach to worker protection starts from the assumption 
that workers’ incomes, and the welfare of their families, depend on their 
job. On this basis, the principal risk to workers’ well-being is the loss 
of employment, not only because unemployment means no income, but 
also because any subsequent job they find is likely to be of lower quality 
(Herrera and Hidalgo 2003).
The traditional instrument for reducing the risk of unemployment has 
been to make employers pay compensation to workers dismissed “without 
just cause”, and this discourages firings and layoffs.16 Because the amount 
of this severance payment rises with the length of time on the job, this 
protection is greater for older workers, although there are generally ceilings 
on the amount a worker can receive.
There are important inter-country differences in the amount of 
compensation and its ceiling, in the definition of “unjust” dismissal, and 
in the prospect that a worker will find another job. While there is general 
agreement that a worker’s bad behaviour, such as absenteeism, justifies 
dismissal without compensation, there is less consensus when he is laid off 
because of the firm’s needs. While some countries tolerate this rationale 
16 The employer is usually required as well to give advance notice of layoff, or to pay the corresponding 
wages.
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for dismissal (with appropriate compensation), in Peru it is valid only for 
mass layoffs, and in some countries it is not accepted at all.17
The severance payment tool has been criticized for discouraging 
labour mobility and hindering productivity growth by preventing workers 
from moving out of low-into high-productivity activities. It is also seen as 
a stabilizing employment for older workers and impeding job access for 
excluded groups, particularly youth and women.
Beyond severance payments as a mechanism for protecting workers 
from unfair dismissal, some countries have introduced other instruments 
(generally as a supplement to layoff compensation) to provide income 
support for the unemployed while they are looking for a new job. One 
approach is to have employers make regular deposits, defined by law, into 
individual worker accounts.18 If he is laid off, or (sometimes) if he quits 
his job, the worker will have built up an amount of capital plus interest. 
In terms of compensation, these accounts have the advantage of offering 
greater security, since the deposits are made regularly and payout in case of 
unemployment does not depend on the employer’s financial situation. In 
some cases, this instrument can lift the restriction on voluntary mobility 
by giving the worker access to savings regardless of the reason for ending 
the contractual relationship. A certain portion of these funds has been used 
on occasion for purposes other than protecting the unemployed worker, 
and this undermines their original function.
Some countries have unemployment insurance systems funded by 
contributions from employers and (in most cases) from workers.19 In some 
cases the State may also contribute. Insurance of this kind provides a subsidy 
to the laid-off worker, for a specified period of time (and sometimes after 
a waiting period), the amount of which will depend on the contributions 
made. Generally, for a worker to be eligible for insurance benefits, he must 
have made a certain minimum amount of contributions, and he must be 
available to accept a new job.
In a few countries, for example Brazil and Ecuador, unemployment 
insurance coexists with individual accounts. Chile’s unemployment 
17 There are other provisions that make layoffs difficult, such as the so-called Bustos law in Chile, 
which bans dismissals until social security contributions are paid (Velasquez 2008).
18 For example, in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela (Velásquez 2005).
19 For example, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Venezuela and Uruguay (Velásquez 2005).
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insurance represents the most recent experiment: it combines individual 
accounts (funded by employer and worker contributions and accessible if 
the worker is laid off or quits) with an unemployment fund ( fondo solidario) 
to which firms and the State contribute. The fund guarantees payment 
of a minimum amount to laid-off workers who have exhausted all the 
money available in their individual accounts before the end of the statutory 
period (up to five months, depending on time in the job). If a worker is 
laid off, the severance payment will be reduced by the amount of previous 
employer contributions to his individual account. It should be noted that 
some aspects of this insurance are being reviewed, as the conditions for 
accessing the funds have been found too restrictive.
Certain aspects of the Latin America and the Caribbean social security 
systems have traditionally been tightly linked to holding a formal job. Few 
countries have specific provisions for the unemployed, and the benefits 
are very limited:
In Argentina, an unemployed worker is covered by health insurance • 
for as long as he receives unemployment insurance benefits or, in the 
case of a laid-off worker who has no unemployment insurance, for up 
to three months, through the contributory social welfare system. 
In Chile, unemployment insurance beneficiaries receive health • 
insurance cover. 
In Peru, voluntary insurance is being introduced to ensure continuity • 
in contributions to the national pension system during periods of 
unemployment.
Generally speaking, the unemployed have access to the universal 
health system or, depending on the features of a country’s system, to its 
non-contributory component. This coverage is usually of lower quality, and 
not everyone outside the contributory health system is protected by it.20
The various instruments of unemployment protection have some 
shortcomings in common, and others that are specific. The main problem 
is that their coverage is restricted because they are tightly linked to formal 
employment systems. In fact, some instruments are valid only for private wage 
earners with formal, indefinite-term contracts. Unemployment insurance 
coverage tends to be low in countries where the informal economy is large 
20 See Mesa-Lego (2005) for an analysis of health systems in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
recent reforms, and their impact.
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and the turnover rate is high, with a growing proportion of fixed-term 
contracts.21 Under these circumstances, only a small proportion of workers 
laid off “without just cause” will receive severance payments, even though 
they are entitled to it.
Given the low average level of wages, the different models have two 
alternatives: to try to provide the unemployed with income levels not too far 
below their previous wage, which would pose serious financing problems, 
or to try to contain the cost of the system by limiting benefits to amounts 
that fall short of family subsistence needs. It is quite possible that the 
severance payment system is attractive to workers because, depending on 
their seniority, they could receive a lot of money if they are laid-off, even 
if it is only a one-time payment. This could hinder voluntary mobility for 
formal workers.
Given the shortcomings of the instruments reviewed above, Latin 
America and the Caribbean countries have frequently resorted to 
substitute mechanisms, especially at times of economic crisis, such as 
emergency job creation programs in the public sector, as described in 
the following section.
21 In Chile, all workers with fixed-term contracts are in principle covered by unemployment 
insurance but, in this case, high turnover means that only a limited proportion of unemployed 
persons enrolled in the insurance system actually benefit from it, especially in the case of the 





Active labour-market policies refer to interventions in the labour market 
designed to combat unemployment and raise workers’ incomes. The main 
instruments are programs for direct or indirect job creation, occupational 
training, employment services (mainly intermediation), and encouragement 
of self-employment and micro-enterprises. Beginning in the 1990s, these 
policies underwent significant changes in reaction to the critical labour 
situation in many countries. They tend to be less controversial than labour 
reforms, as they do not affect the interests of the main participants in 
the labour market and can have a positive effect on the functioning of 
the labour market, for example through encouraging productivity and 
reducing transaction costs. Another factor that must be borne in mind 
is that these policies, the efficiency of which is disputed by a number of 
evaluations (Weller 2004), must be financed from general government 
revenues. Following is a brief analysis of the most significant changes to 
these policies in the region in recent times (Samaniego, 2004; Velásquez, 
2005; Chahad, 2008; Goldín, 2008; Ruiz-Durán, 2008; Toyama, 2008 and 
Velásquez, 2008).
a) Direct and indirect generation of wage employment
Direct job creation programs are normally launched in response to an 
emergency situation when there are no broadly available unemployment 
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protection systems. This generally occurs at times of sharp contraction in 
labour demand, sparked by an economic crisis, natural disaster, or seasonal 
factors. These programs offer temporary jobs at a rate of pay close to the 
minimum wage, where low pay serves as a self-selection mechanism and 
where the stress is on generating employment so that members of poor 
families can earn incomes, a possibility often confined to the head of the 
household. While the design and implementation of such programs have 
traditionally been in the hands of government agencies, non-governmental 
institutions may also offer and execute such projects in some countries 
since the 1990s. The activities involved are generally labour-intensive, 
such as cleaning, construction and maintenance of physical infrastructure. 
A frequent secondary objective of these programs is to improve living 
conditions in areas with high poverty indices.
One of the weaknesses of these programs is that they do little to help 
workers rejoin the labour market, because they do not generate skills or 
know-how recognized by the market. Moreover—and this relates to the 
previous point—even when the emergency is over, it is often difficult to 
cancel programs of this kind because many of the beneficiaries will have few 
alternatives for employment. This generates political pressure to maintain 
the program. Another frequent criticism points to the unequal distribution 
of funding because of political factors or because of differing management 
capacities among participating institutions. To deal with all these issues 
Argentina, for example, has introduced measures such as economic incentives 
for people to seek work and enrol in training programs.
Another alternative is indirect job creation through incentives for 
private businesses to hire workers. The incentive is typically a subsidy to 
reduce non-wage labour costs or to cover a portion of worker pay, always 
for a limited period of time and with the expectation that the contractual 
relationship will survive after the subsidy ends. To improve the chances of 
such survival and of future job opportunities, Chile has added a training grant. 
In some cases, the subsidies vary according to the size of the firm.
Yet there are doubts about the efficiency of these instruments, relating 
for example to possible “dead weight” effects (hiring people who would 
have been hired anyway) and the displacement existing workers by persons 
under subsidized contact. One important element here is the close linkage 
between the program and the economic cycle: at the peak of the cycle 
the “dead weight” effect could prevail, while in the trough the program 
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could lose its efficiency through the substitution effect, or simply become 
ineffectual because firms, seeing no need for further hiring with its attendant 
costs, will not take up the incentives.
While this instrument has been little used in the region, countries 
including Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Panama have recently applied 
it in the context of “first job” programs, where it serves not so much to 
facilitate employment during an economic downturn as to overcome the 
structural barriers facing young labour-market entrants.
b) Training
Among the labour-market policies that have seen the biggest changes 
in recent years is the policy with respect to training. One of the reasons 
for attempting to improve the effectiveness, efficiency and fairness of 
training systems is the recognition that a qualified workforce is needed to 
enhance the systemic competitiveness of Latin America and the Caribbean 
countries. At the same time, the acquisition of useful knowledge and skills 
is recognized as a key component of employability, especially for people 
with little schooling. Training is a factor of equal interest to all parties, 
for its positive impact can be seen both in productivity and in labour 
stability, as it enables workers to climb the occupational ladder and to 
earn higher wages.
During the 1950s and 1960s, Latin America and the Caribbean countries 
set up vocational training systems to promote industrialization and the 
expansion of formal commerce and services. Despite some subsequent 
amendments, concerns over their functioning began to emerge in the 1980s. 
The high costs of those systems, the rigidity in the training offered, and the 
limits on beneficiary groups gave rise to new approaches to training. The 
main changes introduced to address these problems were the following:
Diversification of training providers, with greater reliance on • 
private institutions. In the public sector, the functions of delivery 
and regulation were institutionally separated and programs were 
decentralized, leading to greater participation by local entities 
(provinces and municipalities). 
Interest in the certification of skills, sparked by a greater variety • 
in the offer of training and the recognition of informal learning 
(Schkolnik, Araos and Machado, 2005).
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Attempts to make training more demand-oriented through greater • 
involvement of private enterprise, and in some cases, the unions, 
in identifying unmet needs.
Diversification of target groups. On one hand there was a move • 
from one-time training to continuous training for personnel who 
were of strategic importance for the firm’s competitiveness. On 
the other hand, training programs were developed to encourage 
reintegration of the unemployed. In this context, special programs 
were designed for groups with specific employability problems (youth 
and women with low education levels) or working in low-productivity, 
low-income activities (specific occupations, own-account workers, 
micro-entrepreneurs).
New instruments for the public funding of training, in particular • 
tax incentives.
Despite these recent changes, training systems still fall short of the 
required effectiveness, efficiency and fairness. Following are some of the 
indicators that back up this assertion:
Training systems are not conceived as part of a long-term development • 
strategy focused on continuous improvements in systemic 
competitiveness. If they were, they would serve a key function in 
raising labour productivity. 
The coverage of training systems is generally limited, both in terms • 
of training for first-time jobseekers and in terms of ongoing training 
or retraining for persons already employed or workers who have 
lost their job.
Evaluations of the employability impact of training have produced • 
mixed results. 
Many firms face problems in finding suitable personnel, particularly • 
persons with higher qualifications. 
It is common to see persons who are underemployed in terms of • 
their education and skills. This exerts downward pressure on the 
labour supply.
In several countries, training expenditure has declined or program • 
coverage has retreated, reflecting management difficulties and 
problems in matching supply and demand.22 
22 See for example Chahad (2008), Toyama (2008) and Velásquez (2008).
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A contributing factor here may be that, while the importance • 
of demand-driven training is recognized, it is not always easy to 
determine the exact nature of future demand and to adjust training 
curricula accordingly. There is seldom any capacity for forward-
looking analysis in this respect. 
The take-up of incentives is often unequal: they tend to be used • 
more by large firms than by small ones, and their benefits flow 
to higher-ranking or administrative personnel rather than to 
production workers.
c) Employment services
The main purposes of employment services are: to provide general 
information on the labour market, to intermediate by publicizing information 
on vacancies and jobseekers, and to help prepare labour-market entry 
strategies. These employment services do not in themselves create work, 
but rather facilitate entry into the labour market, thereby helping to reduce 
unemployment and enhance productivity.
Latin America and the Caribbean countries have made significant 
efforts to decentralize the delivery of employment services and to expand 
their coverage by incorporating new technologies, in an attempt to make 
these services more effective and reduce their cost (Mazza 2003). Various 
forms of public-private partnership have also been established (sometimes 
involving NGOs and labour unions) to replace the former, exclusively 
public structure, and by offering services to portions of the informal sector 
(micro-enterprises), intermediation is no longer confined exclusively to the 
formal sector. To take full advantage of their potential, intermediation 
services are now being integrated with active and, where they exist, passive 
labour-market policies. In some countries, employment services are also 
used to deal with international migration.
Employment services are but one of many instruments available for 
matching labour supply and demand. Another instrument is the individual job 
search through direct inquiries, newspaper advertisements and, increasingly, 
the Internet. Despite the progress described, which has certainly made 
employment services more efficient, a great proportion of job placements 
are still arranged through personal contact and recommendations, and 
this tends to undermine the efficiency of matching and to reinforce 
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segmentation in the labour market. This is because workers with more 
highly developed networks of contacts (social capital) have an advantage, 
implying a bias in favour of persons from middle- and upper-income 
households. Consequently, those most likely to turn to employment services 
are people with special employability problems, whether because of their 
low qualification levels, their inexperience, or their lack of social capital: 
this poses a special challenge to the services and makes it more difficult 
to measure and evaluate results.
d) Support for self-employment and micro-enterprise
Given the shortage of demand for labour and the consequent scarcity of wage 
employment, many countries have taken steps to encourage people to work 
independently, either as own-account workers or as micro-entrepreneurs. 
Those measures are designed to help create new businesses, but they also 
support existing ones, with a view to enhancing their productivity and 
output by increasing wages and generating new positions.
To this end, programs have been established with training and financing 
as their chief components, along with technical assistance and networking 
help. Another policy is to facilitate or reduce the cost of registering micro-
enterprises, to encourage them to formalize their status.
As with training, there are two different but complementary approaches 
here. From the enterprise development perspective, small-scale businesses 
are seen as needing special support to integrate them more effectively into 
the productive structure. From the social development perspective, the 
emphasis is on analyzing the employment problems facing broad sectors 
of the population in need of alternative income sources. On the basis of 
these contrasting perspectives, there are great differences between the 
programs’ target groups, their methods and their instruments.
In every part of the world it is common for micro-enterprise start-ups 
to fail, and this poses a special problem for programs designed to encourage 
such initiatives. When it comes to nurturing existing small businesses 
and micro-enterprises, programs have more information available for 
assessing their viability and their new plans. In the case of new initiatives 
for independent work, these are unlikely to offer productive alternatives 
on a large scale at times when few wage jobs are being created, for an 
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adverse economic setting not only affects labour demand as a whole 
but also diminishes business opportunities for new initiatives, because 
of low aggregate demand. Independent employment opportunities that 






Flexicurity and lifelong learning
The three elements discussed in the previous sections —labour-market 
regulation, protection for the unemployed, and active labour-market 
policies— also enter into the debate on reforming labour-market institutions 
in the European Union. Facing relatively high unemployment levels and 
other labour problems, the EU has designed a strategy to improve labour 
performance, and the European Commission has recommended that 
member countries put special emphasis on combining flexible labour 
markets with high levels of social security for the unemployed (European 
Commission 2007).
Denmark’s experience constitutes a significant point of reference for 
the European debate. After a lengthy historical process, the 1990s saw 
establishment of a combination of policies that has been described as the 
“flexicurity” model. This model is characterized by a “golden triangle” 
(Madsen 2006; Jørgensen 2008) that consists of regulations for a flexible 
labour market, an unemployment protection system with generous benefits, 
and active labour-market policies to facilitate prompt and productive 
reemployment of those who lose their jobs (see figure 3).23
23 While these three components already existed, they underwent major reforms in the 1990s. 
The model has been further adjusted during the present decade, and there is debate 
today as to how far the most recent changes might affect the key elements of the model 
(Jørgensen 2008).
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Source: Per Kongshøj Madsen, “Flexicurity – a new perspective on labour markets and welfare 
states in Europe”, document presented at the Directorate-General for Employment seminar 









Main axis of the 
flexicurity model
Figure 3
THE “GOLDEN TRIANGLE” OF THE FLEXICURITY MODEL
a)	 A	flexible	labour	market
Flexibility in the labour market refers to the high mobility of workers, 
fostered by the ease with which firms can hire and fire staff, and also to 
the options available to these workers in a dynamic labour market. The 
legislation offers ample room for collective bargaining, which is regarded 
as an efficient and flexible instrument of labour regulation (Trade Unions 




Another important aspect of flexibility is the existence of a broad 
network of public institutions that provide care for children, seniors and the 
sick, and in this way make it easier for women to enter the labour market. 
While in many societies the gender division of labour assigns women the 
responsibility for these tasks, in this scheme that responsibility falls to 
society as a whole, and women who want to join the labour market face 
fewer obstacles in doing so. Consequently, the female participation rate 
in Denmark is one of the highest in the world.
b) Social security
The social security system provides a high level of income protection 
for the unemployed. Financed primarily from taxes, it encourages high 
turnover rates, especially among low-income groups. While the entitlement 
period for benefits has been shortened in recent years, it remains fairly 
long, at four years.
The unemployment protection system predates the introduction of 
flexicurity, and embraces the traditional model of the welfare state that 
prevailed throughout the 20th century. In that historic tradition, it is 
regarded not only as a component of the “golden triangle” of flexicurity, 
but also as a key mechanism for achieving the welfare and fairness goals 
set by Danish society. All of this presupposes that society is prepared to 
assume the economic costs implied. This basis of protection, and Danish 
society’s steadfast commitment to it despite the change of context, may be 
regarded as key elements for the social viability of flexicurity.
The system for protecting the incomes of unemployed persons can 
be said to improve the functioning of the labour market, for it gives the 
unemployed the opportunity to seek a new job free of short-term pressures, 
and it tends to improve the matching of supply and demand (Acemoglu and 
Shimer 1999). It may be that, as a result, income losses are lower than they 
would generally be when a change of employment is caused by a layoff.
c) Active labour-market policies
Passive labour-market policies, and in particular unemployment insurance, 
are closely linked to active policies that offer various instruments of support 
to people unable to find a new job immediately. Among these are the 
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intermediation system and, above all, the retraining system for workers 
who have few prospects of returning to their former occupation or who 
lack the know-how and skills to find long-term productive employment.
Active labour-market policies begin from the premise that opportunities 
and obligations go hand in hand. It will be recalled that the training 
activities identified for an unemployed person are not merely an option: 
under certain circumstances, the person is obliged to take training in 
order to remain eligible for benefits. To some extent, the same is true with 
intermediation, for there is an obligation to accept the vacancies identified 
by the placement service.
The close connection between passive policies and active policies 
makes the above-mentioned matching even more efficient. The main factor 
behind the lower labour incomes that are usually received in a new job 
following a layoff may be that a portion of the person’s human capital is 
no longer useful because it was relevant specifically to the firm for which 
he previously worked. Retraining can counter this effect, if only partially, 
by enabling the accumulation of human capital, whether general or case-
specific. This not only mitigates the income loss of the person affected, 
but also helps to enhance the productivity of the firm hiring that person 
and, consequently, that of the economy as a whole.
There are two essential elements in the functioning of the institutions 
described as the “golden triangle”:
i) They are closely linked to a long-term competitiveness strategy with 
innovation and human capital accumulation as its main pillars
Danish society recognizes that, in the current context of globalization 
and market integration, the country’s competitiveness, economic growth 
and social welfare will depend on the development and production of 
knowledge-intensive goods and services. In this context, education and 
training play a key role, for continuous innovation in processes and products 
requires highly skilled people, and high-quality production is based on 
high levels of education and training in all areas of the productive process. 
This poses a great challenge to all stakeholders, and especially to people 
with little schooling, who could find themselves excluded if they do not 
upgrade their skills to current requirements.
In this context, the lifelong learning system constitutes a key component, 
beyond the education system itself and the training of children and youth 
(from preschool through to universities that are globally competitive). 
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At a time when markets are undergoing continuous adjustment, it is not 
enough to acquire knowledge and skills that are useful only once, at the 
beginning of one’s working career. In order to achieve continuous productive 
integration, that knowledge and those skills must be frequently upgraded 
and expanded. With this in mind, Denmark has opted to improve the 
recognition of skills acquired outside the formal education and training 
system, to encourage the demand for training by helping to define the skills 
required, above all in small and medium-sized enterprises where a mix of 
training in basic and specific skills is needed, to design short courses at 
new levels, for example at the university level, and to diversify the offer of 
training through a more highly differentiated system of fees (Government 
Figure 4:
THE EXPANDED GOLDEN TRIANGLE
Source: Authors’ conception, based on Per Kongshøj Madsen, “Flexicurity – a new perspective on 
labour markets and welfare states in Europe”, document presented at the Directorate-
General for Employment seminar on flexicurity, Brussels, 18 May 2006, and Henning 
Jørgensen, “Flexible labour markets, workers´ protection and ‘the security of the wings’: 
A Danish “flexicurity” solution to the unemployment and social problems in globalized 
economies?”, unpublished, 2008.
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of Denmark 2006). In this respect, the “golden triangle” is being expanded 
with an additional component, which is continuous upgrading of the labour 
force. This requires a broader vision of the training system than merely 
helping the unemployed to find new jobs, and makes it part of a long-term 
competitiveness strategy.
The intent is, first, to foster productivity by having a labour force that 
can adapt readily enough to the new demands of the labour market; second, 
to facilitate the functional labour flexibility that firms operating in an 
open economy must have so that they can devote their workers to various 
tasks as the productive process demands; third, to raise working incomes, 
which would benefit from this higher productivity; and fourth, to facilitate 
productive employment for persons with relatively low education levels.
ii) Social dialogue as a mechanism not only for the design and application 
of institutionalized flexicurity but also as an instrument for continuous 
adaptation and progress
The Danish flexicurity model has its origins in a long history of social 
dialogue based on the recognition of differing but legitimate interests and 
on negotiation as the principal instrument for achieving sustainable results 
over the long term. Consequently, legal regulation is relatively limited and 
leaves considerable room for employer and union representatives to negotiate 
major aspects of how the labour market functions. This negotiation takes 
place at both the centralized and decentralized levels ( Jørgensen, 2008).
It is clear that the functioning of the system, which confers considerable 
decision-making powers to these organized social partners, depends on 
a high degree of organization and representation. Only in this way will 
the negotiated outcomes win wide acceptance and general legitimacy, and 
only in this way can the exclusion of broad sectors of the unorganized 
population be avoided.
The empirical results show that the Danish model has a positive 
impact on various labour-market variables such as participation rates and 
unemployment. These results are clearly better than for the average of OECD 
countries ( Jørgensen, 2008). Beyond this “objective” performance, it has 
been noted that the Danes —like other societies with a similar institutional 
structure— enjoy greater employment security than exists in countries with 
similar protection systems but with more rigid labour regulations; or in 
those that have rigid labour regulations and weak protection systems; or 
in those that have flexible labour regulations but weak protection systems 
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(ILO 2004b). This is due to the combination of high benefits during periods 
of unemployment and a rapid return to the labour force.
Yet any model can be improved, and mechanisms for analysis and 
constant adjustment are needed to make the available instruments work 
better. In this respect, the debate over the Danish model has identified 
the following challenges:
The model implies heavy fiscal outlays that contribute to the high • 
tax burden. Is it feasible to reduce that burden without upsetting 
the system’s functioning? 
Generous unemployment security provisions usually pose the issue • 
of moral hazard (disincentives to work, abuse of the protection 
system). How can that hazard be controlled? 
As in other economies, some specific groups such as the unskilled, • 
young people who have not completed their studies, older people and 
immigrants, face greater problems in finding productive employment 
in the labour market. How can the system be tweaked to give these 
groups additional support and incentives that will enhance their 
employment possibilities? 
How would the model function if unionization rates declined?• 
As noted above, the features of the Danish model depend a great deal 
on the fact that it is rooted in the country’s history. This means that it 
cannot readily be transferred with all its features to other countries. The 
European Commission has concluded that, while the national strategies 
of member countries must consider the components of flexicurity, the 
political strategy for moving in that direction, as well as the final design, 
would have to be adapted to the specific circumstances of each country. 
Depending on those circumstances, a given country would have to opt for 
specific pathways in preparing its own model of flexicurity, and they would 






Flexicurity and the challenges facing 
the Latin America and the Caribbean region
The transformations in economies and labour markets, the need to protect 
workers, and the need to foster productivity, systemic competitiveness and 
social integration for workers, all underscore the importance of analyzing, 
improving and integrating the workings of the three labour-market 
institutions reviewed above: labour-market regulation, unemployment 
security systems, and active labour-market policies.
The Danish model of f lexicurity is an interesting approach to 
integrating these components, especially because of the process by which 
it was created, rooted in socioeconomic and political elements that are 
peculiar to Danish society and that are adapted to the current context. It 
thus appears sustainable over time, with an adaptation capacity generated 
by broad social consensus on the basic features of the model.
Yet some characteristics of Latin America and the Caribbean societies 
and economies are likely to frustrate any attempt to copy this model: 
Latin America and the Caribbean countries have an informal sector, • 
varying in scope from one society to another, that accounts for 
a significant proportion of the labour market. Despite measures 
taken in recent years, formal labour-market regulation is of very 
limited relevance for workers in the informal sector, as protection 
systems do not cover them, and active labour-market policies do 
not reach them. For these workers, the labour market is very flexible 
indeed, and as they have no tools to protect themselves from the 
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harmful consequences of that flexibility, they tend not to remain 
unemployed for very long when they lose their job or source of 
income. Consequently, in this case the indicators of labour-market 
entry problems are underemployment, stagnating productivity, and 
the lack of social and labour protection, rather than unemployment. 
The instruments of the flexicurity model do not fit with this reality. 
Yet informality is a heterogeneous and dynamic phenomenon, and 
there are options for formalization in each of the three components 
of labour institutions.
The flexicurity model is costly in terms of public expenditure, • 
both because of the protection component and because of labour-
market policies. While the situation varies greatly, Latin America 
and the Caribbean countries generally lack the resources to prepare 
similar programs and policies in terms of coverage and per capita 
outlays.24
For the design and continuous adjustment of the flexicurity model • 
there must be ongoing social dialogue among the main stakeholders, 
who must recognize each other as legitimate interlocutors. The 
history of many Latin America and the Caribbean countries is not 
only marked by conflict but in many cases the opposing parties have 
viewed this conflict as not amenable to negotiated solution, with 
the result that the search for solutions frequently turned violent. 
Moreover, governments have not always accepted or encouraged the 
various stakeholders to organize themselves and adopt independent 
positions. This remains true today, and it impedes the search for 
negotiated solutions, despite the widespread prevalence of democratic 
political systems.
Models that offer a high degree of income protection and significant • 
subsidies for reemployment often pose a moral hazard that results 
in the abuse of these facilities. While a proper combination of 
incentives, disincentives and control mechanisms can help to limit 
such abuse, the results will vary depending on the attitudes and 
values prevailing in specific societies.25
24 The average level of tax pressure in Latin America is 18% of GDP, while in the European Union 
(15 countries) it is 40%.
25 Indeed, it has been argued that for a flexicurity system to work there must be a high degree of 
“public-spiritedness” (Algan and Cahuc, 2006).
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In Latin America and the Caribbean, the short-term view tends • 
to predominate, because the debate over reforming labour-market 
institutions is not part of a broader debate about long-term growth 
and development strategy.
Given the heterogeneity among countries of the region, it is not • 
surprising that the conditions favourable to labour-market institutions 
of this kind are present to varying degrees. Factors such as a low 
rate of urbanization, a low percentage of wage workers, and a low 
degree of formalization represent structural constraints in achieving 
such institutions (Tokman 2007b).
As the European Commission itself has recognized, there is no one 
model of flexicurity nor any one road for achieving it. The countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean need to find their own path to the efficient and 
equitable integration of the three labour institution components, adapted 
to their social, economic, political and cultural reality. Those components 
must be regarded as mutually complementary and they must be related to 
non-labour policy instruments for promoting systemic competitiveness 
and for integrating that portion of the population not covered by social 
and labour institutions.
i) Active labour-market policies
As noted in section 6, recent years have seen some promising advances 
in improving the effectiveness, efficiency and fairness of active labour-
market policies. Yet shortcomings against these three criteria still persist, 
especially when it comes to training, which is a key component both for 
achieving systemic competitiveness in open markets and for giving workers 
opportunities for productive and stable employment and advancement.
The strategic advantage of labour-market policies is that the coincidence 
of interests is greater in this area than in others. Firms and workers 
alike show great interest in training and in effective, efficient and fair 
employment services. Both parties are interested as well, although to a 
lesser degree, in employment creation programs and the encouragement of 
self-employment and micro-enterprises. This can lay the basis for striking 
bilateral alliances to promote these policies, especially in a context where 
most of the financing must come from government, which will be seeking 
a social return on the investment. The State, then, must foster debate on 
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the role of training as part of a strategy for growth and development based 
on continuous improvement of systemic competitiveness. Following are 
some specific points that must be taken into account:
A training system will produce better results if the education system • 
is successful in broadening people’s general skills and knowledge. It 
is essential, then, to enhance the coverage and quality of education 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, on a more permanent and 
equitable basis.26 Without these four elements, training systems are 
unlikely to do much to increase employment opportunities either 
in the short or the long term. 
Training systems need to be reviewed and adapted to the varying • 
needs of the different segments of the productive economy and 
the different sectors of the labour force, i.e. new entrants to the 
labour market (young people in particular), the unemployed, and 
the different categories of people working. 
It would be useful to design systems of permanent (“lifelong”) • 
training to help workers adapt to new technologies, to increase their 
productivity, and to enhance their employment possibilities. This 
will need a major effort to produce a forward-looking analysis of 
demand, involving labour-market players and academics. 
Special attention must be paid to adapting training to the needs and • 
prospects of disadvantaged groups (people with little schooling, in 
particular women, ethnic minorities and the disabled). 
Diversified institutional arrangements may be the answer for dealing • 
with the great variety of demand for training and frequent changes 
in that demand. Yet if abuses are to be avoided, the offer of training 
must be transparent and its results must be controlled, for example 
through recognized systems for certifying skills and knowledge.
Fostering small business and micro-enterprise remains a challenge • 
that will require a combination of instruments to improve access 
to financing, technology, training and information as a means of 
simplifying the formalization process and reducing its costs. Given 
the limited size of the formal sector in many Latin America and the 
Caribbean countries, this is an important task for increasing access 
to the formal labour market.
26 See for example ECLAC/UNESCO (2004).
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Employment services must pursue policies such as decentralization, • 
bringing the various players into the labour market, creating 
incentives to make intermediation more effective, technological and 
organizational modernization, personnel training, the integration 
of intermediation with the different programs of active and passive 
policies, and helping establish individual labour strategies. 
Direct job creation programs are an inadequate substitute for • 
generating employment through the labour market, and they should 
be confined to special situations (economic crisis, low seasonal 
demand for labour, specific local problems). Direct employment 
programs and subsidies for creating new jobs must both include 
training components to enhance the employability of beneficiaries 
over the longer term. 
At a time when fiscal constraints make it difficult to expand and • 
improve active labour-market policies, it is essential to improve the 
ways those programs are evaluated, so that policymakers can take 
informed decisions on priorities in this field.
ii) Protecting the unemployed
Protection for the unemployed in Latin America and the Caribbean is the 
weakest component of the “golden triangle” of the flexicurity model. Few 
countries have protection systems that go beyond severance payments, and 
coverage and benefits are generally limited. Yet there is basic agreement 
on the need to improve protection for the unemployed, for social and 
economic reasons alike. The principal challenge is to design protection 
systems where:
the focus is on income protection rather than job protection; • 
they can be funded by workers and employers without raising non-• 
wage labour costs; 
their coverage can be steadily increased; • 
moral hazard is limited; • 
they are related to active employment policies; and • 
they include a follow-up mechanism with respect to social security • 
coverage (particularly health and pensions).
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An interesting proposal in this regard that was developed in Argentina 
(Goldin 2008) raises the possibility of transforming the severance payment 
mechanism by converting part of it into unemployment insurance, which 
would have greater coverage, would be more efficient, and would provide 
reasonable benefits. The portion of compensation that the firm would 
have to pay in case of a contractual rupture that is not attributable either 
to the employer or the worker is replaced by periodic contributions to an 
individual account. This increases flexibility in case of layoff (although the 
cost is greater in case of dismissal “without just cause”), without boosting 
labour costs significantly. In addition, thought could be given to a scheme 
with additional contributions from workers and the State, as with Chile’s 
unemployment insurance, which combines individual accounts with a 
contributory fund.
In some countries the portability of social security benefits is an important 
instrument for helping the labour market to work more effectively without 
diminishing protection for workers. Sometimes these benefits are linked to 
length of employment in a given firm, and this impedes voluntary mobility, 
because workers would lose their accumulated rights. Making benefits 
portable means that workers can take advantage of better opportunities 
without losing this component of their social protection. At a time of high 
intraregional migration, another important issue on which there has been 
some progress already is to make benefits internationally portable.
iii) Labour-market regulation
The regulation of individual and collective labour relations is no doubt the 
most complex aspect of the debate over how to redesign labour-market 
institutions. Many measures are seen as creating one-sided benefits or risks, 
and it seems to be more difficult to find solutions that are favourable to all 
parties, as, for example, in active labour-market policies. This situation is 
expressed in a lack of consensus in many areas. There is even disagreement 
about the diagnosis itself: the actors on the labour market are unable to 
reach a common interpretation of the current situation, which must serve 
as the point of departure for the debate over pending reforms. Points at 
issue include the costs and benefits of integration into the global economy, 
and the characteristics of labour regulation and the functioning of the 
labour market. Labour flexibility is often confused with low labour costs, 
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or it is identified with only certain aspects (such as the ease of hiring and 
firing), but in addition to flexibility in labour costs and external numerical 
flexibility, internal numerical flexibility and functional flexibility must 
also be considered. From a broader perspective, this concept embraces 
not only flexibility in the labour market (flexibility of employment and 
wages) but also flexibility in the labour input (flexibility of human capital, 
mechanisms for promoting productivity) (Amadeo and Camargo 1993). 
This covers, specifically, the generation of opportunities for workers to 
advance along a career path. In short, it is a complicated matter to describe 
labour institutions as flexible or rigid, because there are so many variables 
involved,27 and each side is likely to make selective use of research data, 
rendering dialogue difficult.
Moreover, the debate is generally conducted at different levels of 
abstraction, such as when an analysis of regulatory rules and their potential 
repercussions on the labour market is contrasted with another that stresses 
how those rules and that market really work, for example by comparing 
mechanisms to limit layoffs and high turnover. What happens, in effect, 
is that the debate takes place “in different markets”, and some studies 
refer to the workings of the formal labour market while others include the 
informal sector in the analysis. Consequently, while from one perspective 
labour institutions may be stagnating in the absence of reforms, from 
another perspective the labour market may be undergoing profound 
changes because of the shifting occupational structure, different uses 
of existing institutions, and de facto modifications at a “lower” level than 
labour legislation (Bensusán 2006).
Another point relating to the foregoing discussion is that the debate 
often lacks specificity, for example when the labour market is claimed to be 
rigid without specifying the origins of this lack of flexibility, or explaining 
which specific regulation is causing what damage (Weller 2007). Rigidity 
may be due not only to labour regulations but also to the functioning of 
other markets and to the behaviour of participants in the labour market 
who might, for example, prefer stable relations to high turnover.
This lack of consensus on the diagnosis makes it difficult to reach 
agreement on how to improve labour regulations. While these discrepancies 
27 Consequently, a country’s ranking in the classifications can change greatly, depending on the 
variables considered.
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are not likely to be overcome in a short period of time, it would be well 
to clarify the terms of the debate in order to address the challenges in 
this area. Among those challenges (with significant differences from one 
country to another) are the following:
Labour-market participants must recognize each other as legitimate • 
stakeholders. Meeting this essential condition is complicated by the 
long history of conflict described above, which means that gradualist 
strategies are needed to build mutual trust. This process differs 
greatly among societies, because of the great variety of historic 
experience. 
In many cases, unions need to strengthen their standing as valid • 
and effective interlocutors for representing workers. To do so, they 
will have to set aside corporatist practices, overcome their lack of 
internal autonomy and democracy, and enhance their negotiating 
capacity by upgrading their research and analysis capabilities. 
The legal apparatus is sometimes incoherent. For example, in some • 
countries there are discrepancies between constitutional rights 
and labour legislation. This means that issues relating to the real 
functioning of labour institutions are removed from the political 
sphere, and also from collective bargaining, and are relegated to the 
courts, with sometimes unpredictable consequences. 
In many countries, enforcement of existing standards is low, and • 
experience has shown that lower costs and greater flexibility are 
not sufficient to raise compliance levels. This can undermine the 
credibility of political decisions and encourage people to seek ways 
to evade the rules rather than make the effort to comply with them. 
On the other hand, it is essential that regulatory compliance be 
objectively feasible. 
In order to make labour institutions efficient and fair, the new economic • 
context tends to demand greater room for collective bargaining as 
opposed to detailed legal regulation. It is important therefore to 
define the levels of bargaining and the issues to be bargained. Yet 
legal regulation will remain essential for setting the “floor”, given 
those broad segments that lack the degree of organization and the 
negotiating ability required.
While the design of labour institutions, as has been argued throughout 
this paper, can only be the result of processes specific to each country, we 
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offer below some suggestions for specific aspects, based on experience 
in the region:
Experience within and beyond the region suggests that the introduction • 
of “atypical” contracts has done nothing to create more jobs, but 
that it has fostered greater segmentation in the labour market. 
Reforms, then, might focus on “typical” contracts, making them 
more flexible and combining them with better protection mechanisms 
(Tokman 2007a). “Atypical” contracts should be reserved for special 
situations, such as seasonal or part-time work, and for specific tasks 
or training. Moreover, care must be taken to ensure that “atypical” 
contracts enshrine the same rights as “standard” contracts, in the 
corresponding proportion. 
Because the main argument against open-ended contracts is the • 
rigidity produced by layoff compensation systems, thought should 
be given to transforming a portion of compensation outlays into 
periodic contributions to an unemployment insurance system based 
on individual accounts. This would not reduce financial protection 
against unemployment and, depending on the monthly contributions, 
the total non-wage labour cost might not decline, but the cost of laying 
off workers would drop. This raises two considerations: first, the 
conditions governing layoffs and dismissals must not be allowed to 
“petrify” existing labour relations, but neither should they encourage 
high turnover. The positive linkage between labour stability and 
human capital formation and higher productivity is a key factor.28 
Moreover, it is frequently the case that firms do not use all the legal 
instruments available to them for achieving greater flexibility in 
their personnel management. This suggests that, from the firm’s 
perspective, maximum flexibility is not necessarily the best option.29 
Rather, it would appear that in a scenario with great and frequent 
28 Chacaltana and Garcia (2001) demonstrate this positive linkage in the case of Peru. Perry et 
al. (2006) highlight the negative impact of labour instability on human capital formation, while 
Auer, Berg and Coulibali (2005) emphasize that the relationship between labour stability and 
productivity is positive but not linear.
29 In Colombia a discrepancy has been noted between certain economists, who favour flexible 
labour markets, and employers, who are more cautious about this (Universidad Externado de 
Colombia 2003). In Mexico there is a divergence between statements by business leadership 
and the behaviour of firms, which do not apply all the available instruments of flexibility (de la 
Garza and Bouzas 1998).
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changes, the ideal solution for meeting both the immediate and 
long-term objectives is not obvious for many firms, which are 
always looking for workable solutions.30 Second, there must be a 
clear distinction between labour costs and flexibility. If inflexibility 
caused by a specific regulation constitutes a bottleneck to the efficient 
working of the labour market, it should probably be amended, even 
if that implies greater costs. The situation would be different if the 
obstacle were related to the amount of labour costs. 
In many countries there is debate over labour institutions as they relate • 
to micro-enterprises and small businesses. Experience has shown that 
in these cases cutting labour costs is not enough to foster wholesale 
formalization (Chacaltana 2007). However, because these costs tend 
to be too high for firms of this kind, a gradual formalization strategy 
that would improve labour conditions in this segment could include 
special provisions that would lower them temporarily. 
Encouraging internal flexibility, in terms of functions, wages and • 
working hours, is an increasingly important issue that requires a 
common legal framework and intense collective bargaining. While 
this aspect of flexibility may yield immediate productivity and 
wage benefits, as employment stability does, it also brings with it 
undeniable risks and burdens, and ongoing dialogue is therefore 
needed to produce the necessary adjustments. 
On the supply side, the lack of flexibility may be an obstacle to • 
labour-market entry, especially for women seeking opportunities 
to earn income for themselves and their family. This is not a minor 
issue, as having more family members employed is one of the main 
ways of lifting a household out of poverty. At that time when cultural 
attitudes to the division of labour that exclude broad segments of 
women from the labour market are weakening, some restrictions 
persist, especially for women with preschool and school-age children. 
For this reason, by opening the range of options for these women, 
policies whereby society assumes part of the responsibility for tasks 
30 For example, in the first stages of the economic downturn that marked the beginning of this 
decade, many US firms showed greater caution with respect to layoffs, compared to the similar 
situation in 1990-91, recalling the trouble they had during the subsequent recovery in recruiting 
back the skilled workers they let go during the crisis (The Economist, 2001 p. 56).
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related to reproduction can help to make the labour supply more 
flexible. 
Given the widespread flouting of many rules, workplace inspection • 
will have to be stepped up. Inspection strategies should help firms 
to comply, rather than punish them for non-compliance, especially 
in the case of small and medium-sized enterprises (Schrank and 
Piore 2007). Other sound initiatives include government awards of 
“good employer” certification to firms that observe the rules, and 






Improving labour institutions: 
some strategic considerations
There is broad consensus that, while Latin America and the Caribbean 
countries face similar challenges, their responses cannot be the same. The 
historic evolution of labour institutions to their current shape, resulting 
from socioeconomic and political processes specific to each country, and the 
nature of the relations between the main participants in the labour market, 
as well as the degree of labour-market development, all have a marked 
influence on the strategic options available for improving labour policies, 
unemployment protection policies, and active labour-market policies.
In this respect, each country has to find its own way of responding 
successfully to the challenges posed by the global economy, in order to offer 
the greatest possible welfare to its people. Labour institutions must make 
their contribution here: their ultimate purpose is to generate high-quality 
jobs by fostering labour markets that work efficiently and by protecting 
and supporting those who are disadvantaged by a market with structural 
inequalities among participants.
One important lesson from the flexicurity model is that the various 
components of labour institutions must be recognized as complementary 
and mutually reinforcing. Yet, because the issue is so politically sensitive 
in every country, it is unlikely that all these institutional arrangements can 
be reformed simultaneously. The key point, then, is to identify the main 
shortcomings in the current institutional structure.
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The long history of labour conflict in many countries is a great obstacle 
to achieving sustainable agreements and reforms in this area, where so 
much mistrust has been generated among the parties. Following are some 
strategic elements for making progress on this issue:
Social dialogue. When reforms are imposed by certain specific • 
stakeholders who seize upon a favourable political juncture to advance 
their interests, they will lack legitimacy and will usually spark pressure 
for counter reforms once the political setting has shifted. This is 
why labour institutions in many Latin America and the Caribbean 
countries are in constant flux. By contrast, negotiated reforms have 
broader legitimacy and are likely to be more stable over time. 
The need to devote more resources to reorienting labour institutions. • 
To avoid boosting labour costs, with potentially adverse fallout 
on labour demand, these resources will have to come from tax 
revenues. On various occasions31 ECLAC has proposed a fiscal 
and social covenant that would set out consensus-based social 
objectives for the long term and would contribute to their financing 
and their macroeconomic sustainability through responsible fiscal 
management. 
Gradualism. While it may seem attractive to negotiate a comprehensive • 
package of reforms covering all areas, such an approach is unfeasible 
in many countries because of the mistrust that prevails among 
the parties. Consequently, what is needed is a process of building 
confidence as the basis for gradual reforms that, if successful, could 
pave the way for new accords. 
Incorporating labour reforms into a long-term development strategy. • 
Such a strategy, with its corresponding objectives, would define 
some of the requirements for sound labour institutions and would 
relate them to non-labour aspects (for example in education and 
technological innovation).
Voluntary commitments relating to certain issues are another mechanism 
for building confidence. Such commitments might be given concrete form 
through adherence to codes of conduct, or through greater consideration 
of labour aspects in policies for corporate social responsibility.
31 See for example ECLAC (2004b). 
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A significant transformation of labour institutions could spark concerns 
about workers’ rights, especially if one component of that transformation 
were the elimination of regulations that are seen by workers as offering 
protection and by employers as causing rigidity. Merely promising that 
such a reform would yield benefits for workers by stimulating job creation 
will clearly not be enough to make such a reform feasible. It would seem 
essential, then, to give priority to designing or improving a system of 
unemployment protection. That system would focus not on preserving jobs 
but on protecting incomes. The features of the system would depend on the 
specific situation in each country and on its success in promoting a social 
covenant for reaching consensus on the complex variables of financing, 
coverage, rights, obligations and supplementary services, among others.
Active labour-market policies help to build confidence. While there will 
no doubt be disagreements, for example over the financing, management 
and control of programs, the fundamental interests of the main stakeholders 
are similar, and this should facilitate agreement on specific instruments. 
Given the great pending challenges, in the area of training for example, 
a broad dialogue on ways to improve active labour-market policies could 
be very helpful in opening room for debate in other areas,
Labour-market regulation is no doubt the most complex area, where 
specific interests clash most openly. It is important to remember that the 
ultimate purpose of regulation is to generate high-quality employment, 
and it must therefore fulfil the dual objective of fostering an efficiently 
functioning labour market and protecting the weakest participants in that 
market. In light of this dual objective, it is clear that it will not always be 
easy to find solutions where all players come out winners, even if there 
are some aspects of flexibility and stability (“rigidity”) that suit both 
employers and workers. As noted earlier, arriving at a common diagnosis 
would seem to be an essential condition for reaching agreement on ways 
to improve labour institutions.
As was argued in section 3, there is no one recipe for this that is 
independent of space and time. What is needed is to analyze matters case-
by-case and identify the obstacles that prevent labour institutions from 
meeting their goals in a specific situation. For that analysis we have adapted 
the proposal of Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2005) for promoting 
economic growth, which consists essentially in identifying the bottlenecks 
in each country that constrain more dynamic growth. This strategy stands 
Labour Markets, Worker Protection, and Lifelong Learning...
68
in contrast to those that offer common recipes for all countries, and it takes 
account of the great diversity that exists among societies in the region, 
where there are different ways of combining employment protection with 
social protection (Tokman, 2007b, p. 51).
To identify the constraints on the generation of high quality jobs we 
may use the “inverted tree” shown in figure 5.32 If there is a dearth of high-
quality jobs—as there is in all Latin American and Caribbean countries 
if we consider unemployment rates, low incomes, scanty social security 
coverage and other factors—we should first examine whether formal job 
creation is low, or if it is significant but low-quality jobs prevail.33
If formal employment generation is low, the second step would be to 
discern whether the problems are due primarily to weak economic growth, 
or to the fact that growth does not have a sufficiently positive impact on 
the labour market, which could be the consequence of either the low output 
elasticity of formal employment or the limited size of the formal sector in 
the country’s economic structure. If low economic growth is identified as 
the principal reason for weak employment generation, causes related to the 
labour market must be differentiated from those not related to it. Among 
the former there are qualitative aspects that have to do with human capital 
accumulation, and aspects that impede greater labour-market participation, 
based on demographic or cultural factors, or on institutional factors that 
constrain labour supply and hiring.
If economic growth is reasonably high but formal employment 
generation remains low, it could be that certain macroeconomic prices, 
such as the exchange rate, are biasing investment against the hiring of 
employees, or that growth is led by sectors that make little use of labour. 
It may also be that institutional factors provoke rigidities or high labour 
costs to the detriment of formal employment. As well, there may be cases 
where the formal employment elasticity of economic growth is reasonably 
32 Weller (2007, pp. 59-64) provides some examples for identifying bottlenecks and possible 
solutions.
33 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that good-quality jobs are concentrated in the formal 
sector, and so the main intermediate objective is to generate formal employment. This is not 
to deny that there may be good-quality jobs in the informal sector, where improving labour 
conditions is an important challenge, or that there may be low-quality jobs in the formal sector. 
The concept of the informal economy, which is broader than the sectoral perspective, embraces 
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high, but the absolute number of new formal jobs created is low because 
of the small size of the sector.
Finally, even if formal employment generation is reasonable, there may 
be problems in generating high-quality jobs, as indicated by low and stagnant 
wages or problems with social protection. In these cases as well, the nature 
of the difficulties can be identified and specific solutions proposed.
The purpose of the “inverted tree” is not to identify a single key 
element for resolving labour problems. Besides indicating bottlenecks, it 
can help differentiate between priority and secondary aspects. The former 
represent a major constraint on quality employment generation, and 
eliminating them could have an important impact. Eliminating obstacles 
in the second category will have a lesser and sometimes doubtful impact, 
and will frequently carry high political costs in relation to the expected 
benefit. If politically feasible, reforming these secondary aspects could 
be part of a negotiated package, where the consensus would relate to the 




Acemoglu, Daron and Robert Shimer (1999), “Productivity gains from 
unemployment insurance”, NBER Working Paper Series, vol. 7352. 
Algan, Yann and Pierre Cahuc (2006), “Civic attitudes and the design of 
labor market institutions: which countries can implement the Danish 
flexicurity model?”, IZA Discussion Paper Series, Nº 1928.
Amadeo, Edward J. and José Marcio Camargo (1993), “Flexibilidad laboral, 
productividad y ajuste”,  Boletín sociográfico, Nº 26, December. 
Auer, Peter, Janine Berg and Ibrahim Coulibaly (2005), “El trabajo estable 
mejora la productividad?”, Revista internacional del trabajo, vol. 124, Nº 3.
Bensusán, Graciela (coord.) (2006), “Diseño legal y desempeño real: 
instituciones laborales en América Latina”, Mexico City, Chamber 
of Deputies/Autonomous Metropolitan University/Porrúa, 
Chacaltana, Juan (2007), “Economic impl icat ions of labour and 
labour-related laws on MSEs:  a quick review of the Lat in 
American experience”, International Labour Organization (ILO), 
unpublished.
Chacaltana, Juan and Norberto García (2001), “Reforma laboral, 
capacitación y productividad. La experiencia peruana”, working 
paper, Nº139, Lima, ILO Regional Office for Latin America and 
the Caribbean.
Chahad, José Paulo Zeetano (2008), “Flexibilidade no mercado de 
trabalho, proteção aos trabalhadores e treinamento vocacional de 
força de trabalho: a experiência de América Latina e perspectivas. 
Análise do Caso Brasileiro”, unpublished.
Cortázar, René (2004), Instituciones y mercados laborales, en BID, Reformas y 
equidad social en América Latina y el Caribe. Memorias de la primera fase 
del Foro de Equidad Social, Carlos Eduardo Vélez y Paz Castillo-Ruiz 
(eds.), Washington, D.C., Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
Labour Markets, Worker Protection, and Lifelong Learning...
72
Danish Confederation of Trade Unions/Confederation of Danish 
Employers/Danish Ministry of Employment (2007), “Joint paper on 
the flexicurity concept” [online] http://www.da.dk/bilag/Joint%20
paper%20BM%20LO%20DA.pdf
Danish Government (2006), Progress, Innovation and Cohesion. Strateg y for 
Denmark in the Global Economy. Summary. 
de la Garza, Enrique and Alfonso Bouzas (1998), “La flexibilidad del 
trabajo en México: una visión actualizada”, Rights versus Efficiency 
Papers, Nº 4, The Institute of Latin American and Iberian Studies, 
Columbia University.
ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) 
(2007a), Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the 
Caribbean 2007 (LC/G.2355-P), Santiago, Chile. United Nations 
publication, Sales, No S.07.II.G.161. 
  (2007b), Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 2006-2007 
(LC/G.2338-P/I), Santiago, Chile. United Nations publication, Sales 
Nº E.07.II.G.2.
   (2007c), Social Panorama of Latin America 2006 (LC/G.2326-P), 
Santiago, Chile. United Nations publication, Sales Nº E.06.
II.G.133.
   (2004a), “Latin America and the Caribbean: population estimates and 
projections, 1950-2050”, Demographic Bulletin, Nº 73 (LC/G.2225-P). 
United Nations publication, Sales Nº  E/S.03.II.G.209.
   (2004b), Productive development in open economies (LC/G2234(SES.30/3), 
Santiago,  Chile.
   (2004c), Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 2003-2004 
(LC/G.2255-P/E), Santiago, Chile. United Nations publication, 
Sales Nº E.04.II.G.2. 
ECLAC/UNESCO (Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean/United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization) (2004), Financing and Management of Education in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Preliminary Version (LC/G.2249 
(SES.30/14)), Santiago, Chile, June.
Ermida Uriarte, Oscar (2007), “La política laboral de los gobiernos 
progresistas”, Nueva sociedad, Nº 211, September-October.
European Commission (2007), Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity: More 
and Better Jobs through Flexibility and Security, Brussels. 
ECLAC 2008
73
Freeman, Richard B. (2005a), “La gran duplicación: los efectos de la 
globalización sobre los trabajadores en el mundo”, Cambios globales 
y el mercado laboral peruano: comercio, legislación, capital humano y empleo, 
Juan Chacaltana, Miguel Jaramillo and Gustavo Yamada (eds.), Lima, 
Universidad del Pacífico.
   (2005b), “Labour market institutions without blinders: the debate 
over flexibility and labour market performance”, NBER Working 
paper series, Nº 11286.
Goldín, Adrián (2008), “Mercado laborales flexibles, protección  de 
los trabajadores y aprendizaje de por vida en una economía global: 
experiencias y perspect ivas de América Lat ina y el Caribe. 
Argentina”, unpublished.
   (2007), Los derechos sociales en el marco de las reformas laborales en América 
Latina, Geneva, International Institute for Labour Studies. 
Gregory, Peter (1986), The Myth of Market Failure. Employment and the Labor 
Market in Mexico, London, The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Hausmann, Ricardo, Dani Rodrik and Andrés Velasco (2005), “Growth 
diagnostics”, unpublished.
Herrera, Javier and Nancy Hidalgo (2003), “Vulnerabilidad del empleo en 
Lima. Un enfoque a partir de encuestas de hogares”, Financiamiento 
del desarrollo series, Nº 130, Santiago,  Chile, Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). United Nations 
publication, Sales, Nº S.03.II.G.49.
Hussmanns, Ralf (2004), “Measuring the informal economy: from 
employment in the informal sector to informal employment”, 
Working Paper, Nº 53, International Labour Organization (ILO), 
December.
IDB (Inter-American Development Bank) (2003), (2003), Good Jobs Wanted: 
Labor Markets in Latin America, Washington, D.C.
   (1997), Economic and Social Progress in Latin America 1997 Report. Latin 
America after a Decade of Reforms, Washington, D.C.
ILO (International Labour Organization) (2004a), Economic Security for a 
Better World, Geneva.
Jørgensen, Henning (2008), “Flexible labour markets, workers´ protection 
and ‘the security of the wings’: A Danish “flexicurity” solution to 
the unemployment and social problems in globalized economies?”, 
unpublished.
Labour Markets, Worker Protection, and Lifelong Learning...
74
Machinea, José Luis, Osvaldo Kacef and Jürgen Weller (2007), “América 
Latina en el 2007: situación económica y del mercado de trabajo”, 
document presented at the seminar on social cohesion and reforms in 
Latin America, Fundación CIDOB, Barcelona, 26 - 27 October.
Madsen, Per Kongshøj (2006), “Flexicurity – a new perspective on labour 
markets and welfare states in Europe”, document presented at 
the Directorate-General for Employment  seminar on flexicurity, 
Brussels, 18 May. 
Mazza, Jacqueline (2003), “Labour intermediation services: lessons for 
Latin America and the Caribbean”, CEPAL Review, Nº 80 (LC/
G.2204-P/E), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo (2005), “Las reformas de salud en América Latina y 
el Caribe: su impacto en los principios de la seguridad social”, Projects 
documents, Nº 63 (LC/W.63), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Ministry of Labour and Social Security (2003), El trabajo y la protección social 
en Chile,  2000-2002, Santiago, Chile.
Morgado, Emilo (1999), “Las reformas laborales y su impacto en el 
funcionamiento del mercado de trabajo en Chile”, Reformas económicas 
series, Nº 32 (LC/L.1221), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
   (2004b), World Employment Report 2004-2005, Geneva.
Perry, Guillermo and others (2006), Poverty Reduction and Growth: Virtuos 
and Vicious Circles,  Washington, D.C., World Bank.
Puyo Posada, Jimena (2007), Los aspectos laborales en los tratados de libre 
comercio con EE.UU., Bogotá, D.C., Instituto de Ciencia Política 
Hernán Echevarría Olózaga.
Ruiz Durán, Clemente (2008), “México: Las dimensiones de la 
flexiseguridad laboral”, unpublished.
Samaniego, Norma (2004), “Las primeras experiencias de evaluación de 
las políticas del mercado de trabajo en América latina: qué hemos 
aprendido?”, En búsqueda de efectividad, eficiencia y equidad. Las políticas 
del mercado de trabajo y los instrumentos de su evaluación, Jürgen Weller 
(comp.), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC)/LOM.
ECLAC 2008
75
Schkolnik, Mariana, Consuelo Araos and Felipe Machado (2005), 
“Certificación de competencias como parte del sistema de protección 
social: la experiencia de países desarrollados y lineamientos para 
América Latina”, Políticas sociales series, Nº 113, Santiago, Chile, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC). United Nations publication, Sales, Nº S.05.II.G.184.
Schrank, Andrew and Michael Piore (2007), “Norms, regulations and 
labour standards in Central America”, Estudios y perspectivas series, 
Nº 77 (LC/MEX/L.766), Mexico City, ECLAC subregional 
headquarters in Mexico.
Squire, Lyn (1981), Employment Policy in Developing Countries. A Survey of Issues 
and Evidence, New York, World Bank/Oxford University Press.
The Economist (2001), “The jobs challenge. Corporate downsizing in 
America”, 15 July.
Tokman, Víctor E. (2007a), “De las reformas del consenso a las reformas 
para el empleo estable y protegido”, document presented at the 
seminar on social cohesion and reforms in Latin America, Fundación 
CIDOB, Barcelona, 26 - 27 October.
   (2007b), “Informalidad, inseguridad y cohesión social en América 
Latina”, Políticas sociales series, Nº 130 (LC/L.2694-P/E), Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC). United Nations publication, Sales, Nº  S.07.II.G.45.
Toyama, Jorge (2008), “Análisis de la implementación de la propuesta de 
la flexibilidad laboral en el Perú”, unpublished.
Universidad Externado de Colombia (2003),   “Ley 789 de 2002. Reforma 
laboral colombiana”, Boletín del Observatorio del mercado de trabajo y la 
seguridad social, Nº 6, December.
Vega Ruiz, María Luz (2005), La reforma laboral: un análisis comparado, Lima, 
ILO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Velásquez, Mario (2008), “Flexibilidad, protección y políticas activas en 
Chile”, unpublished. 
   (2005), “La protección frente al desempleo en América Latina”, 
Financiamiento del desarrollo series, Nº 166 (LC/L.2470-P/E), Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC). United Nations publication, Sales, No S.05.II.G.217.
Weller, Jürgen (2007), “La flexibilidad del mercado de trabajo en América 
Latina y el Caribe. Aspectos del debate, alguna evidencia y políticas”, 
Macroeconomía del desarrollo series, Nº 61 (LC/L.2848-P/E), Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC). United Nations publication, Sales, Nº S.07.II.G.171.
   (comp.) (2004), En búsqueda de efectividad, eficiencia y equidad. Las 
políticas del mercado de trabajo y los instrumentos de su evaluación, Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC)/LOM.
   (2000), Reformas económicas, crecimiento y empleo: los mercados de trabajo 
en América Latina, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)/Fondo de Cultura 
Económica.
Williamson, John (1990) “What Washington means by policy reform”, 
Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?, John Williamson 
(ed.), Washington, D.C., Institute for  International Economics.
World Bank (2007), Doing Business 2008, Washington, D.C.
